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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
VERNE

J.

OBERHANSLEY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

8450
TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

II

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Plaintiff accepts the defendant's statement of issues with
this one explanation: The jury was dismissed at the request
of both parties; therefore, the judgment should not be disturbed if either plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter
of law or a jury question was presented on both or either
issues. Only if defendant was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law should the judgment entered by the district
court be reversed.
1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In this statement of facts, the parenthetical references
are to pages in the transcript. The parties will be referred
to as plaintiff and defendant, and LaMar Pearce will be
called ''LaMar''.
Plaintiff is unwilling to accept defendant's statement of
facts. We believe that the following facts are important to
a determination of this case:
Facts on Employment Issue

At the time of the accident, LaMar Pearce Auto Mart,
a corporation, hereinafter called corporation, was insolvent.
Two cars which the company held on consignment from an
Evanston, Wyoming company were to be returned as a part
of winding up the business ( 4 7). In order to avoid the expense of hiring someone to drive one of the cars to Evanston,
LaMar asked plaintiff to do so because he knew plaintiff
would not charge him ( 3 5). On two prior occasions, plaintiff
had driven cars to points in Idaho for the corporation and
had not asked for nor received either wages or reimbursement
for expenses ( 3 5, 19 2, 19 3) . Plaintiff had never worked
for the corporation or LaMar and he had his own business
( 191). On this occasion, when requested by phone to take
time away from work to assist him, plaintiff told LaMar he
would do so on one condition-that it not cost him any money;
that he wasn't going to dig into his own resources to defray
the costs of the trip ( 194). LaMar then told plaintiff he
would give him $10.00 to defray expenses-pay for gasoline
and meals ( 19 5). LaMar, on behalf of the corporation, accepted plaintiff's services as a favor from one friend to
another, a neighborly, friendly act ( 3 7, 43), and he did not

2
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consider he had the right to boss plaintiff in driving the car
(42). His only interest was getting the cars to Evanston
( 38). Plaintiff had no purpose in going to Evanston other
than rendering the favor to LaMar and his brother ( 38). The
corporation maintained Workmen's Compensation and other
state and federal reports on it~. employees. The plaintiff was
not listed as an employee at any time on any such report
(45). The arrangement for driving the car was a casual and
gratuitous arrangement ( 46). Plaintiff put gas and oil in
the three cars (one to be used by LaMar to return the three
men to Ogden) at a cost of $5.40 ( 19 5), bought lunches for
all three men at Echo Junction, bought dinner for all three
at Evanston (198, 199), and spent in excess of the $10.00
(205).
Facts on Lack of Cooperation Issue
I

LaMar's Conduct. Following the accident, the bu;:,Iness
of the corporation ended and LaMar left Ogden for California
to seek employment (57). He was in debt in Ogden and he
left his address with several people, including an attorney,
Morgan Wixom, but asked them not to make it public except
if necessary (58, 66). Before leaving Ogden, he had advised
defendant of the suit, delivered the summons to it, appeared
on request at the office of its attorney ( 98) and given on
request a written statment to its agent (57, 72, 115, 117). He
went to work at Antioch, California, as a used car salesman
for the Ford dealer. Two months before trial, he received a
registered letter from his attorney, hired for him by defendant in accordance with the policy requirement, advising
him of the trial date and of the necessity that he be present.
In response to that letter he called his father in Ogden and
asked him to call the attorney and advise him that, because
3
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of his employment situation, it was impossible for him to
come to Ogden at the time set for the trial ( 49). He later
received a call from his father, telling him it was important
that he come, and he then received a letter from another attorney, Wixom, advising him he should come. He failed to
appear at the trial.
At the time in question, LaMar was a used car manager
and he was in line to become general manager or new car
manager ( 49) . He made that promotion not long after the
trial was held ( 49). As defendant's witness in the trial of
this garnishment suit, he testified that leaving his work to attend the trial would have jeopardized his chance for this
promotion (51) . The trial could not have come at a worse
time for him, he said ( 60). LaMar, a layman, thought the
statement he had given the defendant company was sufficient
and he assumed that after advising the attorney that he could
not make the November trial date, he would perhaps receive
a letter from him suggesting a future date ( 65), or that an
agent from the Oakland, California office of the defendant
company would contact him if it was important that he be
there (67, 80).
1

Upon being notified of the
suit, the defendant took over the defense in accordance with
its policy.
Upon being advised by Attorney Wixom of
LaMar's address, defendant wrote LaMar a registered letter,
advising him of the trial date and of the necessity of his
presence. Defendant then received a call from Pearce, Sr.,
father of LaMar, advising it in effect that LaMar had received the letter but his employment situation made it abConduct of the Defendant.

4
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solutely impossible for him to come to Ogden at the time set
for the trial ( 81, 83). After being thus advised of the difficulty of LaMar's position, it ( 1) asked the father to tell
LaMar that it was important that he be here in Ogden, and
(2) asked Attorney Wixom, who was not representing LaMar
in any way in connection with this matter, to write him and
ask him to appear on the date set.
Defendant company had a local claims office in Oakland,
California ( 184), about forty miles from Antioch~
The
Oakland agent regularly covered Antioch and could have contacted LaMar without going out of his way ( 185), but the
defendant did not deem it advisable to do so ( 185).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
The Court did not err in Entering its Finding No. 5
POINT II.
The Court did not err in Entering its Finding No. 6
Defendant in its brief has listed five points of argument;
however, if its Points I and II are not well taken, then it follows that its Points III, IV, and V are not well taken. Therefore, we will limit our argument to Points I and II as stated in
defendant's brief.
ARGUMENT
Point I.
The Court did not err in Entering its Finding No. 5
For convenience of treatment, argument on this point will
be divided into the following three issues:
5
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1. Plaintiff's injuries were not covered by the Utah
Workmen's Compensation Act.
2. Plaintiff was not an employee under the common
law.
3. In any event, plaintiff was not an employee within
the meaning of that word as used in defendant's
policy of insurance issued to LaMar Pearce Auto
Mart.
We think the second issue above is not determinative of this
case; however, since it has been treated by defendant in its
brief, we shall answer it herein.

1. Plaintiff's injuries were not covered by the Utah WorkDefendant's argument on this
men's Compensation Act.
issue may be summarized as follows: 'cThe Workmen's Compensation Act excludes only employees whose work is both
casual and not in the regular course of the employer's business.
Conceding plaintiff's employment was casual, still it was in
the regular course of the business of LaMar Pearce Auto
Mart; therefore plaintiff was an employee within the Act at
the time of his injuries." We submit that this argument assumes the relationship in issue. We submit that the important question is whether or not plaintiff was an employee
within the meaning of that word as used in the Act, and that
definition is contained in Section 35-1-43, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as follows:
"'Employees', 'workmen' and 'operatives' definedCasual employn1ent-Mining lessees and sublesseesPartnership members; -The words 'employee', 'workmen' and 'operative', as used in this title, shall be
construed to mean:

" ( 2) Every person, except agricultural laborers

6
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and domestic servants, in the service of any 'employer'
as defined in subdivision (2) of section 35-1-42, who
employs one or more workmen or operatives regularly
in the same business, or in or about the same establishment, under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, including aliens, and minors
whether legally or illegally working for hire, but not
including any person whose employment is but casual
and not in the usual course of trade, business or occupation of his employer."
We have italicized the words "under any contract of
hire" in the above definition because we believe they are
determinative of this issue. Black's Law Dictionary, 2nd
Edition, defines the word "hire" as follows:
"To engage in service for a stipulated reward, as to
hire a servant for a year or laborers by the day or
month; to engage a man to temporary service for
wages."
The Utah Court has in several cases ruled that the de finition given in the Workmen's Compensation Act requires that
the person performing the service receive consideration therefor-that is, be paid a wage or salary. Thus in Bingham City
Corporation vs. Industrial Commission, 66 Utah 390, 243 P.
113, the court, after pointing out that it is necessary that some
consideration be in fact paid or payable to the employee,
said:
"The purpose of the act is to provide compensation
for earning power, lost in industry, and the only basis
for computing compensation is the earning ability of
the employee in the particular employment out of
which the loss arises. In short, the term 'employee'
indicates a person hired to work for wages as the employer may direct."

7
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Now, plaintiff was not a person hired to work for wages
as LaMar Pearce Auto Mart might direct. He did receive
$10.00, it is true, but he received that $10.00 to defray the
costs of the expense of the trip-it was expense money, and
it was so considered by the two parties involved There is
no suggestion in the transcript that Pearce gave the $10.00
or that plaintiff accepted it as wages or compensation for
the service to be rendered. Since plaintiff received no compensation for this service, it is clear he was not an employee
within the Workmen's Compensation Act, and the question
of whether or not the service rendered was casual or whether
or not it was a part of the regular business of LaMar Pearce
Auto Mart becomes immaterial.
2. Plaintiff was not an employee of LaMar Pearce Auto
Mart under the common law. As previously stated, we think

this issue is not determinative, but we shall treat of it, nonetheless. On page 15 of its brief, defendant asks us to assume
that plaintiff, while driving the car from Ogden to Evanston,
had negligently injured a third person, and asks:
"Can anyone doubt that the injured party could have
recovered judgment against the auto mart?"
We think probably the third person could not have recovered
against the auto mart under the assun1ed facts for the reason
that the U tab court in similar circumstances has so ruled.
The case of Dowsett vs. Dowsett, 116 Utah 12, 207 P. 2d 809,
is the Utah case most nearly in point that we have been able
to find. In this case, Darwin Dowsett was in the Army,
stationed in Texas. He wanted his wife to join him and bring
the automobile from Salt Lake City. She did not drive, so
he requested his mother and father to drive the car down,

8
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with the wife riding as a passenger. The mother and father
were to take turns driving the car, and on the way, with the
father driving, there was an accident. The mother sued the
son, claiming the father was his agent in driving the automobile, and that the son was liable under respondeat superior.
The Third District Court granted a motion dismissing the
case on the grounds that the mother and father, in driving
the automobile to Texas, were employees of the son and the
mother could not recover for negligence of the fellow servant.
The Supreme Court on appeal held that the District Court
erred in its holding that the mother and father were employees
of the son. It held that an independent contractorship relation
was involved, and not an employer-employee relationship.
Chief Justice Wolfe, in an excellent concurring opinion, points
out the distinction between the two relationships and states
that clearly the relationship was not one of employer-employee. He states that while it does not seem to fit exactly
into the independent contractorship, still, where public policy
does not dictate that the doctrine of respondeat superior
apply, it should be placed in the independent contractorship
even though it does not have exactly all the aspects of that
relationship.
In considering this issue, let us bear in mind that the
employer-employee relationship is a contractual relationship.
It is created out of a binding contract between two persons.
There is no more fundamental principle in the law than this:
A binding contract must be supported by consideration. Defendant in its brief states that the existence of control by one
party over the person performing the services is an essential
and almost determining factor in the employment relationship.
All of the cases cited by defendant in its brief deal with the
question of control, and we have no quarrel with any of them.

9
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Note, however, that in each of them there was a binding contract and the question of control was considered in each of
them as an aid in determining whether or not that binding
contract created a master-servant relationship or some other
relationship.
When the courts speak of the question of control, they
speak of the legal right to control, and this legal right can
only come out of a binding contract. For every legal right,
there is a correlative legal duty, a breach of which gives rise
to a legal cause of action. When there is a legal right to control, there is a correlative legal duty to obey. If, then, Pearce
had the legal right, for example, to order Oberhansley to
stop at Morgan for sandwiches and if Oberhansley instead
stopped at Echo, Pearce could sue him for violating his legal
duty. Now, obviously, under our evidence in this case,
Pearce would not be able to sue Oberhansley, for the simple
reason that Oberhansley had not bound himself to any legal
duty toward Pearce. He had not entered into any binding
contract. An essential element is missing--consideration.
The Utah Supreme Court uses similar reasoning in the
case of Gleason vs. Salt Lake City, et al 94 Utah 1, 74 P. 2d
1225, which case is cited by defendant in its brief. The
question involved was whether. or not a fireman was an employee of the store company where he worked to extinguish
a fire. The Court considers whether or not the fire department was employed by the store, and it says:
" ... There was no binding contract in advance. The
Fire Department was under no obligation to do the
work and could have withdrawn at any time without
liability for breach of contract . . . . Because there
10
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was no contract, the company could have requested
the defendant to desist at any time without liability
to it for breach of contract."
And:
"There being no contract between the company and
the city or the men of the Fire Department, either
could have withdrawn without liability to the other.
The company could have said to the firemen when
they came to pump the shaft, 'We do not want you
to do the job, you may go', or the fire chief could have
withdrawn the men at any time. It is argued that because the company could have directed the men to
desist from doing the work at any time during its performance, this gave it such power of control that it is
liable for their negligence. That, however, is not the
sort of control referred to in the cases which impose
liability on the principal or master for the negligence
of the servant. The kind of control necessary to impose liability is the right of control over the details
of the work, or the means or method of its performance. The fact that the fire chief could have called
his men back to the station or could have refused to
do the work at the request of the company but emphasizes the independence of the Fire Department,
and tends to exclude any relationship of master and
servant between the company and the firemen."
And in Bingham City, et al, vs. Industrial Commission, cited
and quoted above, the court, after pointing out why the
volunteer fireman was not an employee within the meaning
of the Workmen's Compensation Act, goes on and says this:
" ... The deceased was not in the service of the city
under any appointment or contract of hire or at all.
There were no contractual relations between them
11
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whatever .... There was no legal duty or obligation
on the part of one to the other. There was therefore
no relationship of master and servant or employer and
emp1oyee ... "
It is true that wages are not always essential to create
an employment relationship. It is also true that the important
element to consider is the question of right to control. However, if there be no wages or other benefit flowing to the doer
there can be no right to control, and there can be no employment because there is no binding contract.
3. Plaintiff was not an employee within the meaning of
the defendant's insurance policy.
We think this is the

determinative issue on this employment question. This issue
has not been touched upon by the defendant in its brief.
We commence consideration of this issue with the universally accepted principle that words used in an insurance policy
are to receive their ordinary meaning, but when a word is
ambiguous or susceptible of more than one meaning, it must
receive that meaning which is most adverse to the insurance
company and most favorable to the insured. That principle
is used in the cases cited and quoted hereinafter.
The question was not directly involved in the case
Jewtr.aw vs. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, 131
NYS 745. However, because of the language used in that

case, we believe that it is a good introduction to the issue and
we quote it at length. In this case, the insured was a costume
man and he had to make a trip to Ottawa, Canada, from New
York to get costumes for a winter carnival. He asked the
plaintiff to go along with him to help, and he agreed to pay

12
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the plaintiff's expenses. It was understood that the plaintiff was to be paid wages for the trip, but he had not actually
been paid at the time of the trial. In considering whether
or not the plaintiff was an employee of the insured, the court
said:
"What employment might be regarded as sufficient
to hold a man a nongratuitous passenger in an automobile traveling in Ontario under the Ontario statute
might be something less, or at least different, from
what might be construed to be 'employment' in an exclusion clause relieving an insurance company of responsibility to its insured. When these legal areas
are looked at, it is to be seen that they are not congruent in the geometric sense and therefore the answer
given to one is not inevitably the answer to be given
to the other.
"The policy covered Davis (the insured) generally
for all liability which a court might impose on him for
injuries arising out of the operation of his truck, unless the exclusion became operative. Under familiar
principles, the exclusion must be construed strictly
against the carrier .

"Since we have no New York statute avoiding liability
for negligence to a gratuitous guest, the question of
when a rider in a vehicle may be something more than
a guest but something less than an employee of the
owner of the vehicle seems not to have been passed
on; but cases have arisen in which consideration has
been given the question of what is 'employment' and
how it influences other effective legal relations. An
examination of these cases suggests that the problem
in the action now before us ought to be treated as an
issue of fact.
13
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"One such case is Ferro vs. Leopold Sinsheimer Estate,
Inc., 256 NY 398, 176 NE 817, 818, upon which, as we
have noted before, both sides of this controversy have
relied at one time or another. A boy about thirteen
years old had been occasionally asked by the superintendent of a building to do some errands and small
odd jobs for which the superintendent from his own
funds gave him 'a little money, a mere gratuity'. The
boy was injured while helping the superintendent clean
an elevator cable.
"The action was dismissed at Trial Term because the
court there was of opinion the relationship was one
of employment, to which the \Vorkmen's Compensation
Law applied; but the court of appeals held it was
not employment within the statute and that an employment relationship had not been 'contemplated or
established' . . .
"In Mandatto vs. Hudson Shoring Company, 229 NY
624 129 NE 933, cited supra, the distinction between
a contractual relation of employment and· a 'casual'
and 'voluntary' rendering of a 'slight' service or favor
for which a gratuity is given was recognized. The
expressions used are from the dissenting opinion in
this court, 190 App. Div. 71, 179 NYS 458, adopted
by the court of appeals on reversal.
Quite similar
language is found in Lazar vs. Steinberg, 269 App.
Div. 760, 54 NYS 2d 859. These cases suggest that
the actual relation between Jewtrew and Davis in
making their trip together to Ottawa could be found,
as a question of fact, not to have come within New
York's legal conception of what is 'employment'.
"When we turn to decisions in other States in cases
quite closely approaching the one before us under
guest statutes we seem to find some further support
for the view we take of what disposition ought to be
14
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made of the case. In Sills vs. Sorensen, 19 2 Wash.
318, 73 P. 2d 798, the assured invited plaintiff to
make a trip in his automobile to act as a witness for
assured on the payment of a bill, for which service the
plaintiff was given $2 by the assured. Injured in an
accident the plantiff recovered against the assured
under a complaint which avoided the effect of the
Washington guest statute by pleading he was employed by the assured.
"But the Washington court held that plaintiff was
not precluded by the judgment in the main action from
showing that this was not 'employment' as used in the
policy of insurance excluding liability to employees of
its assured injured in the course of their employment
in the business of the assured. The court was of opinion
there was an absence of such control over a man hired
to become a witness as to avoid the conventional effect
of employment and treated him as an independent
contractor . . . .
"Where a man agreed to drive a truck from one city
to another for a corpo_ration of which his employer in
another business was an officer, without compensation
and without consideration other than two meals, it
was held by the same court that he was not an 'employee' of the owner of the truck within an exclusion
provision of the policy, Braley Motor Co. vs Northwestern Casualty Co., 184 Wash. 47, 49 P·. 2d 911.
It was further held that under the form of submission
of the negligence action in which recovery had there
been allowed against the insured the injured party was
not deemed conclusively to have been found to be an
employee of the owner of the truck.
"In Standard Accident Ins. Co. vs. Swift, 92 NH 364,
31 A. 2d 66, a student in a school summer camp made

15
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a part paYffi:ent of tuition by assuming additional responsibilities in the work program which all students
at the camp shared. In the course of voluntarily assuming suc4 additional responsibilities he was injured.
The New Hampshire court held that this did not fall
within the 'employee' exclusion clause of a liability
policy.
"The same court construed similarly an injury sustained by a relative of the assured's riding to the assured's home in the North with the understanding she
should work for the assured a month later, the assured
bearing the expenses of the trip from the South on
which the injury was incurred. It was held that this
was not 'employment' within the scope of the policy.
Merchants Mutual Casualty Company vs. Manzer, 93
NH 34, 35 A. 2d 392. See also Home Indemnity Co.
vs. Village of Plymouth, 146 Ohio St. 96, 64 NE 2d
248." (parenthesis added)
In Braley Motor Company, Inc. vs. Northwestern Casualty Company, a Washington case reported in 49 P. 2d 911,
the injured person had worked for Braley Motor Company,
Inc., the insured, for a period of several years selling automobiles on a commission basis. A short time before the accident, the injured person left this employment and went to
work for a Mr. Braley, the president of the insured corporation, selling oysters. It was necessary that Braley Motor
Company, Inc. pick up a truck in Seattle, \~Vashington, and
arrangements were made between Braley and the injured
person for the two of them to drive together from Aberdeen,
the home town, to Seattle and pick up the truck, and then one
would drive the car back and the other one the truck. No
consideration or compensation was given for the trip; however, Braley bought the injured person his breakfast and
16
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luncheon on the trip. The court held that there was no employment relationship in the following words:
" . . . . It is evident that the word 'employed' was
used in the insurance policy, in its ordinary and natural
sense, as implying the relationship of master and servant. The service rendered by Kantonem (the injured
person) was casual and gratuitous. He was driving
the car wholly as an accommodation to the appellant,
even though he may have had some incidental benefit
in the way of pleasure or the hope of future business.
In construing the language of the policy, if construction is needed, we are to keep in mind the familiar
rule, that the construction will be adopted which is
the most favorable to the insured.
" 'There is another principle applying to contracts of
insurance to the effect that if they are so drawn as to
require interpretation and fairly susceptible of two
different conclusions, the one will be adopted most
favorable to the insured and will be liberally construed in favor of the object to be accomplished, and
conditions and provisions therein will be strictly construed against the insurer as they are issued upon
printed forms prepared by experts at the instance of
the insurer, in the preparation of which the insured
has no voice (citing cases).' " (parenthesis added)
In Rickenbaker vs. Layton, et al, a South Carolina case,
59 Fed. Sup. 156, the injured person was a rural mail carrier.
The insured asked him to accompany him (insured) on a
trip around the rural mail route to show him where several of
the insured's customers lived. The trip was taken and after
the injured person had pointed out the residences of the
various customers, the parties left the route and drove to a
small nearby town, and then the accident occured on the way
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home. It was claimed that the injured person was an employee of the insured. The insured testified that although
no definite arrangements were made as to payment of compensation, he expected and anticipated that he would have to
pay the injured person for the services rendered by him and
he expected to take it out of his expense account. The court
held that there was no contract of employment. It stated:
"A contract of employment, like any other contract,
can only arise out of a meeting of the minds of the
contracting parties; and such a contract usually involves the agreement of one party to render services
or labor for the benefit oi another, who in turn becomes obligated, expressly or by implication, to pay a
consideration therefor. The testimony in this case
hardly warrants the inference that such a relationship
has been established between the insured and the plaintiff as of the time of the accident. The fact that no
compensation was agreed upon, or ever asked by, or
paid or offered to the plaintiff, for whatever he may
have done on the afternoon in question, although five
years have now elapsed, lends some support to plaintiff's contention that he was not at any time an employee of the insured ... "
The court also says:
" . . . . in the construction of insurance contracts,
that meaning should be attributed to the language used
which ordinarly is given to such language, unless it
is susceptible of more than one reasonable construction, in which case it will be given that construction
which is most favorable to the insured ... To say that
a casual employee of the insured, who was not at
the time of his injury engaged in any business of the
18
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insured, and had not been for two hours, is excluded
from coverage would be to give the language of the
policy a strained construction or else to resolve a possible ambiguity in favor of the insurer and against
the insured.''
In Daub, et al, vs. Maryland Casualty Co., 148 SW 2d 58,
the plaintiff, age sixteen, performed work for insureds about
their house. On one occasion he raked leaves for a morning
and was paid twenty-five cents and his dinner. A few weeks
later he grubbed out a stump in the back yard and was paid
$1.50 and his lunch. Shortly thereafter, insured contacted
the boy at his home and asked him to rake leaves, and he was
injured while so working. The policy insured against liability
to "any person or persons not employed by insureds".
The court held the boy was not an employee within the
meaning of the policy, using the following language:
"The word 'employed' is capable of a great variety
of interpretations, and is therefore subject to restrictions and limitations arising from its use in connection
with other words, or from the context of the contract
or statement in which it appears. The word as used
in the policy in suit here obviously imports the relation
of master and servant or employer and employee, but
it does not necessarily import every sort of such
relationship . . . . . The restrictive words 'not employed' are susceptible of many meanings, and therefore necessarily introduce ambiguity and leave the
clause open to construction. And that construction
most favorable to the insured must be adopted.
"The word 'employee', which is the correlative of employer, is commonly used as signifying continuous
service, or as designating a person who gives his whole
19
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time and services to another for a financial consideration, or as designating a person who performs services
for another for a financial consideration, exclusive of
casual employment, or a person in constant and continuous service, or a person having some permanent
employment or position, or a person who renders
regular and continued services, not limited to a particular transaction, or to a person having a fixed tenure
or position. The words, employed and employee, as
used in insurance policies, generally denote regular
employment, as distinguished from occasional, incidental, or casual employment .... (citing cases)
"It is clear that Winton Meyer, at the time of his injury, was not regularly employed by plaintiffs, or a
regular employee of plaintiffs, and he is therefore not
excluded from the coverage of the policy.'' (parenthesis added)
In Sills, et ux, vs. Sorenson (Fireman's Fund Indemnity
Co., Garnishee), a Washington case reported in 73 P. 2d 798,
insured's wages had been attached, and he desired to travel
to a neighboring city to pay the creditor. He asked the plaintiff to accompany him and act as witness to the payment and
agreed to pay him and did pay him $2.00 as wages for the
services. On the return trip the accident occurred, causing
injury to plaintiff. The exclusion provision was the same as
that in our present case. The court held there was no employment, and it said:
"We proceed from the well-established and oft-repeated principle in the law of insurance that, if the
policy be so drawn as to require interpretation
and its language is fairly susceptible of different conclusions, that construction which is the most favorable
to the assured in affording him protection under the
policy will be adopted. (citing cases)
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"Both parties concede, and likewise proceed upon the
theory, that Sills (plaintiff) was actually paid the
sum of $2 for the service to be rendered by him on the
trip . . . . .
"What, then, was Sills' relationship to Sorenson (assured)? Respondent contends that he was an employee in the legal sense of a servant. Appellant contends that his employment was that of an independent contractor. It appears certain that he must fall
within one or the other of these two classifications.
"The word 'employee', though more euphonious, has
the same legal significance as the word 'servant'. It
imports some sort of continuous service rendered for
wages or salary and subject to the direction of the employer or master as to how the work shall be done."
(parenthesis added)
The court then considers the distinction between employee
and independent contractor, as applied to the facts, and concludes that plaintiff was an independent contractor and not
an employee.
Not strictly in point, but of considerable interest, is the
case of B & H Passmore Metal & Roofing Co., Inc. vs. New
Amsterdam Casualty Company, 147 Fed. 2d 536. Chief
Justice Phillips of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals gives
an excellent discussion of the difference in interpreting the
word "employee" as used in compensation acts and the word
as used in insurance policies. In this case, the deceased
regularly worked as a roofer for the insured. He and other
employees were provided transportation to and from their
places of work by their employer, but they were not paid for
the time consumed in so traveling. Death resulted from an
accident occuring while returning in the employer's truck from
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a job at the end of the work day. The court held that whereas
the language of a workmen's compensation act should be liberally construed in favor of the injured workman and all reasonable doubt as to its meaning resolved in his favor, the exclusion clause of an insurance policy must be strictly construed against the insurer. The court then held that the
death did not occur while deceased was engaged in the business
of the insured, and that the exclusion provision was inapplicable.
In Bean et al vs. Gibbens, et al, a Kansas case, 265 P. 2d
1023, the defendant insurance company defended under
an exclusion provision which provided that the policy did not
apply to bodily injury, sickness, disease or death of any employee of the insured while engaged in the employment. The
facts were that the insured was driving a truck and the truck
broke down and he was in the process of towing it into a garage when he asked the deceased to assist him by drving the
truck that was being towed for him. The deceased agreed to
do so, and the insured instructed him fully as to how the
truck was to be driven and directed and controlled him therein.
The court held that the deceased was not an employee of the
insured. It uses the following language:
"The real question was the fundamental relationship
between Gibbens and Wilber under all the surrounding facts and circumstances. The word 'employee' as
defined in the New Century Dictionary is:
" 'A person who is in the employ or regular working service of another, as a clerk, workman, etc.'
"Black's Law Dictionary, 3d Ed., at page 657, defines
the word 'employee' as follows:
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"'This word "is from the French, but has become
somewhat naturalized in our language. Strictly
and etymologically, it means 'a person employed',
but in practice in the French language, it ordinarily is used to signify a person in some official
employment, and as generally used with us,
though perhaps not confined to any official employment, it is understood to mean some permanent employment or position." '
"On the same page Mr. Black defines the word 'employ' as follows:
'To engage in one's service; to use as an agent
or substitute in transacting business; to commission and intrust with the management of one's
affairs; and, when used in respect to a servant or
hired laborer, the term is equivalent to hiring,
which implies a request and a contract for a compensation, and has but this one meaning when
used in the ordinary affairs and business of life.'
"Also 56 CJS, Master and. Servant, Paragraph 1, page
27, defines 'employee' as follows:
' "Employee has also been defined as a person in
constant and continuous service, one who performs services for another for a financial consideration exclusive of casual employment.'
The court in concluding approved the following conclusion made by the trial court:
" .... the task performed by said Wilbur Leroy Bean
for defendap.t was occasional, incidental, casual and
a neighborly act."
and held that the exclusion provision did not apply.
You will note that in most of the cases above quoted, the
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facts brought the parties closer to an employment situation
than existed in our present case. Yet in each of them the
court, relying in part upon the familiar rule of interpretation
of insurance contracts, finds that no employment within the
meaning of the word as contemplated by the parties to the insurance contract existed.
Assume for the sake of argument there is some efficacy
to defendant's argument on this question and that there are
instances where the facts in this case can be stretched to embrace an employment relationship. Nonetheless, the word
"employee" is normally defined as a person who does service
for another under a contract of hire. Thus, in Stricker vs.
Industrial Commission, 55 Utah 603, 188 P. 849, the Utah
court, after quoting the Workmen's Compensation Act definition of "employee" says:
"The statutory definition adds nothing to the generally accepted definition of 'employee'. An 'employee'
is one who works for and under the control of another
for hire."
Assume that definition were the unusual one rather than
the one generally accepted. Still, under the rule of interpretation of insurance contracts quoted above, it is the one
that should be adopted by the court, and in this case Oberhansley just doesn't fit into that definition. The service
rendered by him was a casual, gratuitous, neighborly act and
neither authority nor logic can make him an employee. We
submit, therefore, that the court did not err in entering its
Finding No. 5.
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POINT II.
The Court did not err in Entering its Finding No. 6
This point involves a question of whether or not the
court should have found as a matter of law that the insured
failed to cooperate with the insurance company, and hence
that the insurance company is relieved of liability under its
policy.
Counsel for defendant in its brief would have the court
ignore the conduct of the insurance company in considering
this point. They say that the court made no finding on the
matter and therefore it is not before the Supreme Court. The
court made a finding on the ultimate fact, and the ultimate fact
G C b.l' i. «JJ Tl ol1
was whether or not there was a failure of eoHsKfei=atioa. It
was not required to make a finding on any evidentiary fact,
and the reason or reasons why it concluded that there was no
lack of cooperation would be evidentiary.
The question of cooperation is a two-faceted question. It
is impossible to consider that question without examining
both the conduct of the insured and of the insurance company.
Obviously, an insurance company cannot sit back and make no
requests for cooperation and then complain because the insured failed to cooperate. Obviously, if it makes no request
that the insured appear at the trial, it can't complain because
the insured fails to appear. The insurance company must
make some effort, and whenever in the law some effort is
required, the law requires that that effort be a reasonable
one. And by definition, reasonable effort means due diligence.
The question, then, is a two-faceted one: ( 1) What, if anything, did the insurance company do to obtain the cooperation, and ( 2) In what manner, if at all, did the insured fail
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to cooperate? We certainly do not agree that the conduct of
the insurance company is in the nature of an estoppel which
must be pleaded and proved by plaintiff. The defendant
raised this defense: "We sought our insured's cooperation
and he refused it." That defense placed in issue the question
of how defendant sought its insured's cooperation.
This logic finds support in authority. The following language from Traders & General Ins. Co. vs. Rudco Oil & Gas
Co., 129 Fed. 2d 621, is typical of the language we find in the
cases:
" . . . . the rights of the insurer (to control the defense of a suit on behalf of the insured) are not absolute, they are subject to moderation by the rule of
right and justice. Exclusive authority to act does not
necessarily mean the right to act arbitrarily (citing
cases). The right to control the litigation in all of
its aspects carries with it the correlative duty to exercise diligence, intelligence, good faith, honest and
conscientious fidelity to the common interest of the
parties (citing cases). When the insurer undertakes
the defense of the claim or suit, it acts as the agent of
its assured in virtue of the contract of ins11rance between the parties, and when a conflict of interest
arises between the insurer, as agent, and assured, as
principal, the insurer's conduct will be subject to
closer scutiny than that of the ordinary agent because
of his adverse interest (citing cases)" (parenthesis
added)
In Jensen vs. Eureka Casualty Company, 10 Cal. App.
2d 706, 52 P. 2d 540, the insured made a report of his accident to the insurance company. When he was served with
the complaint and summons, he delivered them to the insurance company, and promptly responded to the notice sent
26
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to his given address to appear and verify the answer. Then
several months later, when the attorney desired to take his
deposition, he could not be found and he was not located
and did not appear at the trial. The court held that the insured had not failed to cooperate with the insurance company,
and it used the following language:
'' . . . . . the violation of the cooperation clause of
such an insurance policy by the insured, where the
insurer is substantially prejudiced thereby, is a valid
defense is well settled (citing cases). This rule, however, must be interpreted to assume that the insurer,
diligently and · in good faith, has complied with the
terms and conditions of th~ policy." (parenthesis added)
To the same effect, see Pigg vs. International ldemnity Company, a California case reported at 261 P. 486.
In Rinnard vs. Northwestern Mutual Fire Association,
187 Wash. 47, 59 P. 2d 1072, it was held not to constitute a
breach of the cooperation clause of the policy where the insurer had informed the assured that his wife was a party to
the action, and in response to a request by the assured, refused to accept the obligation of paying the assured other
than his expenses in attending the trial, without compensation
for the assured's lost time from work or for his wife's expenses, and where no steps were taken by the insurer to
secure the deposition of the assured.
In Finkle vs. Western Automobile Insurance Company,
a Missouri case reported at 26 SW 2d 843, the suit against
the insurance company brought by the injured party who
had recovered judgment against the insured was defended on
27
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the grounds of want of cooperation. The insured turned the
summons over to the insurance company, and shortly thereafter, the insurance company attorney took his deposition. At
that time, the attorney told the insured they would have to be
present at the trial to testify. Thereafter, at another meeting with the insureds, the attorney again impressed upon
them the importance of their being present at the trial. The
insureds left the state without informing the insurance company and never communicated with the attorney or with the
company. Two weeks before trial date, the attorney wrote
the insureds, advising them of the trial date and asking
them to communicate with him at once. This letter was returned to the attorney undelivered, and the company began
an immediate investigation to learn the whereabouts of the
insureds but could not locate them for trial. The court held
there was not a lack of cooperation, and it said:
"What constitutes 'cooperation' within a policy requiring the assured to cooperate with the insurer in
the defense of an action brought against him is usually
a question of fact (citing cases).
''Now in the case at bar, so long as they were in the
city, defendants seem to have cooperated very fully
with the garnishee, and to have acceded to every request for assistance which its counsel made. They
came willingly to Teasdale's (the attorney) office
when he expressed a desire to go over the case as a
whole with them; they presented themselves in response to the notice to take depositions, and, if they
were not cross-examined by Teasdale, it was through
no fault of their own .....
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"Under such a situation, it appears that there are two
ultimate questions to be determined: First, whether
the assured was guilty of bad faith in leaving; and,
second, whether the company exercised reasonable
diligence in ascertaining his whereabouts, and in procuring his attendance at the trial, or his deposition for
use in lieu of personal appearance.

" .... we think it is an open question as to whether
the garnishee used due diligence toward securing
their attendance at court . . . . .
"Of all the reported cases that we have been able
to find, the one perhaps most favorable to the garnishee is Schoenfeld vs. New Jersey Fidelity and Plate
Glass Insurance Company, supra. There the assured
had left this country for Russia, leaving no address
where he might be communicated with, and, when the
company was unable to locate him, it withdrew from
the case, and allowed judgment to go against him by
default. It is significant, however, that the company
withdrew from the defense two months before the
default was taken, and that its attempts to locate the
assured had occurred over a long period of time prior
thereto. Even upon such a state of facts, the court
held that the question of the company's good faith
was for the jury to determine; and, if there was a jury
question present in the Schoenfeld case, how much
more pointed is the issue in the case at bar . . . . "
(parenthesis added)
In Durbin vs. Lord, an Illinois case reported in 68 N E 2d
537, there was held to be no lack of cooperation when the insurer did almost everything that could reasonably be done
to secure the attendance at trial of insured, who had left the
jurisdiction and could not be loca'ted.
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In Murphy vs. Hopkins, et al, a South Dakota case in 4
NW 2d 801, in response to a request from the insurer that she
appear at the trial, the insured wrote two letters. In the
first she said that she had offered to have her deposition
taken before leaving the town of trial and it was refused, and
since the case had been continued once, she didn't see why
it couldn't be continued again. In the second letter she said
she couldn't come because of financial considerations. The
insurer made no offer to pay her expenses, and the court held
there was no lack of cooperation when she failed to appear
at the trial.
In Strode vs. Commercial Casualty Insurance Co., (Kentucky), 102 F. Supp. 240, the trial against insured was set
for January 10, 1950. It was then continued, and the insured was so advised. On March 27th, an attorney for insured wrote the attorneys for the insurance company, advising them the insured's employment position would be
jeopardized if she left town to appear for the trial, but she
would be willing to give her deposition. The insurance attorneys acknowledged the letter and advised the atto.mey it would
be vital for insured to attend the trial in person, as she was
the only witness for the defendant. An offer was made to
pay her expenses to the trial. The insured's attorney then
wrote the insurance company attorneys that she could not
attend in person because it would mean her job. The insurance company attorneys then wrote as follows: "If Mrs.
Campbell (insured) refuses to attend the trial as indicated
in your letter, we will withdraw fron1 the defense of her case
and not be responsible for any judgment rendered."
The case was set for trial on May 2nd. On April 27th,
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the insurance attorneys wrote to the insured's attorney, with
whom they had been corresponding, advising him of the trial
date. They also wrote to another attorney in the same town,
requesting of him that he try to locate the insured. This attorney wrote and advised that the insured had left town and
left no forwarding address. When the insured failed to appear,
the attorneys withdrew and defended the garnishment action
of the grounds of failure to cooperate. The court said:
"The intentions of the parties at the time of inception
of the contract was that there should be mutual assistance in defending any effort to obtain money from
Mrs. Campbell growing out of her operation of the
car described in the policy. The legal part of any
claim for damages was to be left to the insurance
company. It was to hold her harmless to the extent
of the terms of the policy and to furnish all legal
counsel required and to notify her when she was
needed to assist. That was certainly the spirit and
reasonable interpretation of the terms of the policy.

"It appears from the record that the defendant was
only looking for an excuse to abandon it.s insured's
case. Mrs. Campbell had given a perfectly rational
explanation of why she could not attend the trial.

"Liability insurance between the company and its
insured presupposes that the company will become the
champion of its insured when misfortune, in the way
of accident, overtakes her and she is sued. . . . . It
is something of a trust relationship where the interests
of the insured and no~ the interest or convenience of
the insurance company are paramount.
31
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"An offer in compromise is shown to have been made
by the plaintiff to the insurance company in the former
case of Strode vs. Campbell, S!Jpra, before judgment
in the Court of Appeals. Mrs. Campbell was not
even advised that such offer had been made. This
is not the kind of cooperation from the company which
the insured had a right to expect.
"I am convinced, upon a careful consideration of the
whole record, that Mrs. Campbell showed no sufficient lack of cooperation ~thin the meaning of the
policy to justify the company in abandoning her case.
"It is apparent that the casualty company was much
more concerned in finding an excuse to set up a legal
barrier between it and its client than it was to fulfill its just obligations to save her harmless . . . .

"I must conclude that the defendant did not discharge
its obligations under the terms of the policy to its insured, Mrs. Campbell, by making a genuine effort
to protect her rights .... "
The Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming this decision,
( 202 Fed. 2d 599), ordered striken the criticism of the insurance attorneys, and we approve. No one who knows them
would question the integrity of the insurance attorneys in our
present case. It seems to us the evil lies in the insurance
arrangement that places attorneys in the position where they
are attorneys for one person and are hired by and work for
another person whose interests they must watch out for and
whose interests are adverse to those of the client. Also, perhaps some blame should be placed with the insurance companies who place attorneys in such an impossible position and
then seek to take advantage of it. There is certainly good
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sense in the rule that requires the conduct of an insurer to be
closely scrutinized when its interests become adverse to the
insured and that requires that they perhaps lean over backwards to be fair in such circumstances. Certainly, insurance
companies are entitled to protection against fraud. But they
should not be protected when they, by mistake or design or
lack of proper diligence, create or foster the fraudulent situation.
We have reviewed all of the case cited on this point by defendant in its brief. We believe that none of those cases is
helpful in determining this case. Those cases are helpful in
determining the effect of a failure to cooperate, but they are
not helpful in determining what constitutes a failure to cooperate. For example, counsel states that the Coleman case,
quoted on page 3 2 of defendants brief, is persuasive, and
reliance is placed upon it by defendant. Compare the facts
in that case to the facts in ours. There the insured was a
corporate pharmacy and it was sued for making an erroneous
prescription. The insurer took over the defense in accordance with the policy. Its attorney wrote to the secretary of
the insured corporation, the man who had apparently made
the improper prescription, and requested that he appear and
sign the answer to the complaint. The secretary refused to
sign the answer and refused to talk to the attorney about the
case. The atorney then wrote letters to the insured requesting that some other officer come in and sign the answer.
These letters were ignored. The attorney then wrote requesting that a conference on the matter be held at any time and
place of insured's choosing. These letters were ignored. The
insured positively refused to cooperate in any manner unless
the insurance company would agree to assume complete
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liability regardless of the amount of recovery. Certainly
this was, as Justice Cardozo stated, a default involving more
than just sluggishness or indifference.
Admittedly, too, some of the cases cited herein are not
strictly in point on the facts, although the Strode case seems
awfully close. In the Strode case, the conduct of the insured
seems more uncooperative than the conduct of Pearce, and
certainly the insurance company in that case made more effort
than the insurance company did in our present case. In any
event, the cases cited herein seem to us to present the principles upon which this case should be decided. Since each
case must be decided upon its facts, and since the facts seem
so important in deciding this point, let us again briefly list
categorically what each party to this insurance contract did.

Pearce:
1. Notified the insurer of the accident.
2. Submitted the suit papers to insurer when served.
3. Appeared on request before the insurer and gave
a written statement.
4. Appeared before insurer's attorney on request.

5. Left town without notifying insurer.
6. Upon receipt of a letter from insurer, notified
it that his employment situation prevented his
being at the triaJ at that time.
7. Took no further action, although he received
Attorney Wixom's letter soon thereafter, and although advised by his father that it was important he be there.
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The Insurance Company:

1. Wrote a registered letter to Pearce, telling him
he had to appear at the trial.
2. Received word from Pearce that he couldn't
appear for the November trial because of his job
situation.
3. Although advised of Pearce's difficulty, told
Pearce's father it was important that he come.
4. Although advised of Pearce's difficulty, asked
Mr. Wixom to request Pearce to come.

5. Had a claims office forty miles from where
Pearce lived and had agents that covered
Pearce's town.
6. Did nothing more.
Now let us review briefly the explanations given by the
two parties to this contract.
Pearce:

He was in line to be manager of the Ford agency and
did become manager soon thereafter. He said leaving his
job at the time in question would in fact have jeopardized his
chances of promotion. "It was the worst possible time", he
said. The situation was the same when he received word
from Mr. Wixom and his father. He knew the insurance company had an office nearby and thought it would get in touch
with him if everything wasn't all right. No explanation was
ever made to him as to why it was important to attend the
trial, how long it would take, the consequences of his not
appearing, why the case could not be held at a time when his
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promotion or job would not be jeopardized, or any other explanation. Laymen don't appreciate the importance of these
things. Pearce wasn't a lawyer-that's why laymen hire
lawyers. That's one reason why Pearce had a lawyer in this
case and had paid for that lawyer when he paid his insurance
premiums.
The Insurance Company:
It says it didn't ask for a continuance because plaintiff's
attorney would have objected and the court woudn't have
granted it. Possibly the writer, representing the plaintiff,
would have objected to a continuance, although I doubt it.
Possibly the court would have refused the continuance, although it is extremely doubtful. In any event, an effort might
have been made. Defendant says Pearce never requested
that they obtain a continuance. However, the defendant company and not Pearce had control of the suit. Pearce had contracted away his right to handle the defense, and the insurance company had assumed its policy right to do so. The
defendant says in its brief that a roundabout rumor reached
it that Pearce would not attend. We submit that the telephone
call from Pearce the father was neither a rumor nor was it
roundabout. It was direct communication in response to the
registered letter sent by the defendant company. Defendant
says its policy did not require it to send a representative of the
company to visit Pearce, and besides, it wouldn't have done
any good anyway. Whether or not the insurance policy which
required the insurer to exercise due diligence and good faith in
representing the insured imposed upon it the obligation of
contacting the insured is a question that must be decided by
the court. Would any attorney, having the normal fiduciary
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responsibility to his client that is inherent in the attorneyclient relationship, and having received a communication from
his client containing a reasonable excuse why he could not
appear at the trial at a given date some six weeks or so prior
to the trial date, have sat back and said, "Well, it won't do
me any good to try to get a continuance. It won't do me any
good to try to con tact him again, and so I '11 let it go.'' It is
inconceivable! It appears from defendant's off-the-record
statements in its brief that it assumed that Pearce would attend the trial, even after receiving the communication from
him that his employment situation made it impossible for
him to do so. It appears that the defendant made a mistake,
and it now seeks to impose the burden of that mistake upon
the plaintiff.
Defendant asserts that Pearce had no right to place his
convenience above his contractual obligation. However, the
record shows it was not a matter of convenience. After all,
he did make his promotion soon after the trial was held, and
it was a substantial promotion.
Defendant suggests that Pearce should have advised defendant that if a continuance were asked for, he would come
at a later date. We submit that when Pearce advised defendant it was impossible for him to attend the trial at the
time set, he was in effect asking defendant to try to arrange
for a different time. If there was any misunderstanding between insurer and insured, it was not the fault of insured.
Pearce advised defendant of his inability to come and of the
reason therefor, and thereafter defendant did absolutely
nothing even reasonably calculated to clear up the situation.
As a matter of fact, how simple it would have been for defendant to have avoided this whole issue if it had made a
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three minute telephone call to Pearce, or asked one of its
Oakland adjusters to see Pearce some time when he was in
Antioch, or written another letter advising and explaining
the situation and inquiring further into the job situation and
when Pearce would be able to come to the trial-doing anything any attorney would do for a client in whose welfare he
was truly interested. Nor is it an excuse to say that the contract of insurance did not require it to do so. That contract
established a fiduciary relationship and the defendant's obligations are measured by that relationship. Counsel's statement in his brief that Pearce received "official" notice of the
trial date is the key to the whole affair. We think we need
not suggest to the court why that one and only letter from
defendant to Pearce was registered. And as plaintiff's counsel
in the original tort action, may we say that Pearce's presence
at the trial would not have bothered us one bit.
Defendant suggests that Pearce failed to cooperate as
part of a large conspiracy between him and the plaintiff.
In support of this contention, it says that plaintiff's brother
changed his testimony at the trial and plaintiff and his
brother and Pearce were all good friends. Defendant qualified
as a legal expert an insurance adjuster who admitted he had
never been to Iaw school, and this expert testified in his
opinion the statements given by plaintiff's brother and Pearce
constituted a complete defense to the original action. I ask
Your Honors to read these statements to determine whether
or not that is an accurate expert opinion.
If in fact there are some discrepancies between Keith
Oberhansley's statement given to the insurance adjuster and
his testimony at the trial, it is not the first time that an in38
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surance adjuster in his quest for facts exonerating his insurance company failed to obtain a complete picture of an accident.
In Johnson vs. Johnson (ldemnity Insurance Company),
a Minnesota case in 3 7 NW 2d 1, a case in which the insured
and the injured party were related by marriage, the court said:
" . . . . Friendliness between the parties is no evidence
of lack of cooperation. Neither is hostility necessary
to cooperation."
The fact that the insured and the injured person were
brothers and that the insured employed an attorney to bring
suit against himself on behalf of his injured brother was not
held to show lack of cooperation in Levy vs. Idemnity Insurance Company of North America, a Louisiana case in 8
Southern 2d 774.
It seems to plaintiff's counsel that this case carries rather
dangerous implications. If the defendant's position on this
matter of lack of cooperation is sustained by the court, it
seems that it will open the door to all sorts of questionable
practices on the part of insurers. It seems, also, that it will
do something more serious than that-it seems that it will
undermine the attorney-client relationship. If an insurance
company representing a client in a law suit is required to do
no more than the defendant company did in this case, then
certainly no attorney representing any client in any law suit
is required to do more, and the bars will be down on the rather
sacred fiduciary duties of an attorney toward his client.
The language of the court in MacClure vs. Accident &
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Casualty Insurance Company, a North Carolina case in 49 SE
2d 74 2, seems pertinent.
"The (cooperation) clause cannot be interpreted in a
way that would make it a mere device to entrap the
insured, or a technicality so arbitrarily weighted that
without detriment to the insurer in the performance of
its obligation to defend, it wipes out that obligation,
which is the essence of the contract, and a duty wholly
surrendered to the insurer by its terms. We are unable to adopt a theory so opposed to substantial justice." (parenthesis added)
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARDS, ALSUP & RICHARDS

Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent
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